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Report – Developments related to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
The first speaker in the session on developments related to the Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC) pointed out that the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was going 
through an interesting and controversial period. In late April 2012, the CWC will celebrate its 15th 
Anniversary since its entry in force. Late April is also deadline for destruction of chemical weapons 
by declared possessors and this process of destruction has proven more difficult than first envisaged, 
resulting in the two biggest possessors, the US and the Russian Federation, being unable to meet the 
deadline. This has been openly acknowledged recently and a process of consultations is underway in 
order to determine the organisational response. The speaker pointed out that there was no 
precedent for this eventuality, and the issue has generated a number of different points of view.  
The speaker said that there appeared to be a general recognition that both countries probably made 
miscalculations in terms of destruction deadlines and went through periods of difficulty, particularly 
during the 1990s. In this regard, it was noted that there was little doubt about the determination of 
both countries to finish the job of destruction and currently it looks at though the United States, 
which has been working on destruction for 14 years, will have destroyed 90% of chemical weapons 
by the deadline. The Russian Federation has been destroying weapons for 9 years and, in 
quantitative terms, has destroyed as much as the US. The speaker said that if everything proceeds as 
planned, the Russian Federation will have destroyed 65% by the April 2012 deadline.  
Many participants in the discussions at the OPCW have expressed interest in knowing exactly when 
the Russian Federation and the US will be able to finish the job. The expectation was that the 
Russian Federation is aiming for completion by the end of 2015, however there are problems 
committing to a specific date because both the calculations and plans are always an estimate. The 
recommendations from the 2011 CWC Conference of States Parties (CSP) pushed for the maximum 
effort for destruction and requested the provision of further information. Unfortunately, there was a 
vote on this recommendation, with one country (Iran) unable to support the majority.  
The speaker went on to outline some of the other challenges faced by the OPCW. It was noted that 
there had been significant changes in science and technology as well as in the international security 
scene since the Convention had opened for signature.  It was considered that this led to a need for a 
more formal review of the Convention. The speaker said that it was intended that this review would 
be done in a different way from the usual five yearly Review Conferences. The new Director General 
of the OPCW had requested a panel of experts make recommendations for future OPCW priorities, 
taking into account all relevant developments in international security, the chemical industry and 
science and technology, consistent with the objectives of the Convention. The Advisory Panel had 
met four times and the 14 members produced a report that was circulated to States Parties and 
made available electronically1 in mid July 2011. This made recommendations that aim at ensuring 
the relevance and viability of the Convention in the years and decades to come. It recognised that 
destruction was going to be late, but progress had been significant and had taken significant 
resources. Notwithstanding these delays, it was recognized that the OPCW needed to prepare for a 
transition from efforts primarily focused on the elimination of chemical weapons stockpiles and 
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production facilities, to a situation in which the main task of the OPCW will be to ensure that the 
menace of chemical warfare and the use of toxic chemicals for hostile purposes will never reappear, 
and that international cooperation and assistance in the field of peaceful uses of chemistry can 
flourish.  
The speaker noted that the CWC had been drawn up in a way that put significant resources into 
verification. Article VIII of the CWC stipulates that the budget must consist of two sections, one 
relating to administrative and other costs, and one relating to verification costs. A problem is that 
several governments have become accustomed to the view that the section on administrative and 
other costs should never be higher than the one on verification costs. However, administrative and 
other costs include international cooperation assistance, protection and other key activities, which 
play an important facilitating role. Accordingly, if this section of the budget is cut it will generate 
problems and limitations in what can be achieved.  
The speaker went on to consider the issue of S&T, recalling that this was receiving high level 
attention and there had been a recommendation to strengthen the structures of the OPCW in this 
area as well as generating closer cooperation and cross fertilisation between the OPCW and the 
BWC. The speaker went on to mention Libya where it was noted that the destruction process had 
been interrupted due to technical problems, prior to the conflict. The new authorities in control of 
Libya had reported additional chemical weapons agents that had not been previously declared. The 
speaker suspected that when the previous government conducted its evaluation this was not 
declared.  
The second speaker began by recalling the core objectives of the Convention: chemical 
demilitarisation; non-proliferation; national implementation; assistance and protection; 
international cooperation and universality.  
 In terms of chemical demilitarisation, the speaker reiterated that possessors have declared 
71.01% of category one chemical weapons destroyed. The US had reportedly destroyed 
almost 90% of its stockpiles and the Russian Federation had almost completed 57% of its 
stockpiles; whereas Libya had destroyed 54.5% of its category one weapons and 39.6% of its 
category two weapons, and 100% of its category three weapons. To date investigations 
indicate that nothing has been taken from Libyan facilities over the course of the recent 
internal conflict. However, it was reported that additional information was received during 
the Conference of States Parties (CSP) held in the previous week regarding Libya which was 
being addressed. The CSP had adopted a report setting out the transparency and reporting 
mechanisms that States Parties have to undertake. Abandoned weapons in Japan and China 
are also being checked. 
 On the issue of non-proliferation, in 2011, OPCW completed 209 inspections and with the 
budget for 2012, it was proposed that there would be 219 inspections in 2012, 229 in 2013, 
and 241 in 2014.2 The budgetary issues were considered a significant topic at the CSP with a 
staggered increase over the next three years in inspections of other chemical production 
facilities (OCPFs). The OPCW have done the necessary analysis to accommodate this increase 
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and revised the selection methodology to randomly decide the location of inspections in 
order to make the gap between inspections shorter and geographically broader in scope. 
More generally, the speaker identified this as an area in which there had been a great deal 
of work, including seminars which looked to the future and sought to wrestle with issues 
such as the convergence between biology and chemistry, particularly in terms of safety and 
security. The OPCW had also undertaken a challenge inspection exercise hosted by Thailand, 
in which Australia played the role of requesting States Party.  
 On the issue of national implementation, it was noted that all but two States Parties have a 
National Authority. 47% of States Parties had adopted legislation in all key areas suggesting 
that more attention was required in this area, not least as the adoption of legislation was 
considered likely to become a more significant issue as the States Parties move past 
destruction. OPCW had been providing technical assistance to help draft legislation and the 
African programme was renewed in 2012, thus supporting another 3 years of work on the 
effective implementation of the CWC across Africa.    
 Regarding assistance and protection, the speaker said that the OPCW could provide training, 
advice and guidance in addition to which there were a number of States Parties willing to 
offer advice and training. The Organisation had also run exercises, such as the Assistance 
Exercise (ASISTEX).3 As recently as November, the United Nations Counter-Terrorism 
Implementation Task Force (CTITF) released a report on “Interagency Coordination in the 
Event of a Terrorist Attack Using Chemical or Biological Weapons and Materials”.4 This 
report pointed to the need for greater coordination and the need for more exercises 
between the different agencies involved. In its meeting last week, the CSP had adopted a 
decision supporting the idea of an international network for assistance to victims of CW.  
 In terms of international cooperation under Article XI of the CWC, the speaker said that 
there was an associate program and other mechanisms through which to train people in 
certain techniques. Moreover, the November 2011 workshop on Article XI had come up with 
a detailed list of recommendations in terms of cooperation.5 These had been discussed last 
week when the States Parties had adopted an agreed framework on the full implementation 
of Article XI.  
 On Universality, it was noted that there were eight states not party to the CWC. One of 
these, Myanmar, has indicated that it intends to ratify the CWC soon and is engaged in 
discussions. Other non-parties are more difficult, in part as they are located in regions 
suffering from strained relations, specifically the Middle East and North East Asia, although it 
was reported that Israel (a signatory state) remained an observer whereas Syria and Egypt 
(both non signatory states) had engaged with the OPCW. There had been no response from 
DPRK.  
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In his closing remarks, the second presenter outlined some additional developments. It was noted 
that the SAB had met twice in 2011 and that there were two working groups, one on sampling and 
analysis and a second on convergence; the chair of the latter had been taken over by Bill Kane of the 
United States. In addition, there was agreement to establish a third working group on education and 
outreach, something that the speaker noted was of definite relevance to this workshop on the BWC 
Review Conference.  
The speaker concluded by reiterating that OPCW was entering a period of transition and there were 
a number of debates surrounding this transition. It was recognised the budget would be radically 
different, with staff reductions along the way. Nonetheless, the OPCW was preparing for the Third 
CWC Review Conference. As part of this, there will be an IUPAC workshop on developments in 
science and technology of relevance to the Convention, which will take place in February in Spiez, 
Switzerland, which was likely to address the issue of convergence of chemistry and biology amongst 
other topics.  
A number of issues were raised in the subsequent discussion on developments related to the 
Chemical Weapons Convention. On the temporary working group on education, it was noted out 
that whilst previous work had been done on education and codes through IUPAC, there had been 
political constraints on setting up a CWC working group earlier. The new group has not yet met. 
However, participants largely agreed that it would be important to ensure that the experience from 
the BWC intersessional meetings on codes and education was fed into the working group’s 
deliberations and there were suggestions for an experts-type meeting under the CWC on this topic 
in August.  
Indeed, it was suggested that there was greater scope for moving forward with closer engagement 
with the meetings of the BWC States Parties in Geneva. In terms of the convergence between 
biology and chemistry one participant pointed out that the main issue was that discrete chemicals 
produced by biological processes could be used for chemical warfare and bioregulators could be 
produced by new methods. It was recognised that this could have positive implications, and that 
there were a number of benefits, not least in terms of protection aspects.  
In terms of science and technology under the CWC, it was noted that there would be a new high-
level scientific advisor appointed to advise the OPCW Director General (DG) on issues related to 
science and technology (S&T) developments. In addition to which it was said that the SAB had been 
moved so as to become the responsibility of the policy review branch; this had been a particular 
decision by the DG who sees S&T as an important issue.  
The information about chemical weapons in Libya was also discussed with participants seeking 
further information, specifically in terms of the status of the newly discovered chemical agents, and 
whether these should be categories as ‘previously undeclared’ or ‘newly declared’. It was pointed 
out that much of the information on Libya was relatively new and there was a lack of clarity on the 
details, which rendered in-depth assessment difficult at this stage. In this regard, it was noted that 
before starting to judge the situation, there was a need to assess what had happened.  
On the issue of administration type activities it was pointed out that there was a scaled down 
Implementation Support Unit for the BWC in Geneva and the question of resources versus 
expectations faced by the OPCW was raised to inform the expectations in Geneva. From the OPCW 
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side, participants estimated that there were roughly 20 to 30 individuals working in each of the four 
branches of the Organisation. There was less clarity on exact budgets for travel or the cost of the 
database development, both of which were much harder to quantify. The issue of transfer was also 
raised and it was pointed out that, when an OPCW lab finishes with equipment, it is handed to 
National Authorities. This includes computer equipment, and was augmented by a voluntary funding 
scheme. Finally, on the issue of destruction, it was observed that countries have different methods, 
but sea dumping was categorically prohibited. One participant stated that safety and security issues 
are important in the destruction process and it makes the process very complicated.  
Report – Preparatory Committee Meeting BWC 13 – 15 April 2011 
The first speaker in the session on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) Preparatory 
Meeting began by noting some examples of activities done in preparation for the Seventh Review 
Convention, specifically the Montreux workshop entitled Developing Practical Proposals for the 
Seventh Review Conference. A number of points from the Co-chairs’ summary produced from this 
workshop were highlighted before the speaker turned to the Preparatory Committee discussion. The 
speaker pointed out that the President Designate had introduced the provisional agenda agreed for 
the Seventh Review Conference, which was identical to that of the Sixth Review Conference apart 
from slight modifications to agenda items 11 and 12. Specifically, there was a change from 2006 
language stipulating:  
11. Consideration of issues identified in the review of the operation of the Convention as 
provided for in Article XII and any possible consensus follow-up action 
12. Other matters and the question of future review of the Convention 
To language for 2011 that stipulated:  
11.Consideration of issues identified in the review of the operation of the Convention as 
provided for in its Article XII and any possible consensus follow-up action 
12.Follow-up to the recommendations and decisions of the Sixth Review Conference and the 
question of future review of the Convention 
13. Other matters 
The speaker went on to say that it had been agreed to prepare eight background papers, noting that 
this was two more than in 2006; the additional papers being a) a document on common 
understandings reached by the Meetings of States Parties during the second intersessional program; 
and b) a document on the implementation of Article X. The first speaker concluded by noting that 
there had been a number of additional workshops held in, inter alia, Beijing, Montreux, Berlin, 
Manila, Clingendael, Como and Serbia in preparation for the Seventh Review Conference, pointing 
out that the States Parties were very well prepared for the Review Conference and that there were 
high expectations for the meeting.   
The second speaker agreed that the preparation for the Seventh Review Conference had been good 
with a number of workshops around the globe. Moreover, the indications for the Review Conference 
were positive and the atmosphere appeared conducive for success, with some 27 advance copies of 
working papers submitted to the ISU and a number of proposals emerging on the key topics. He said 
that the Review Conference was going to be busy with a number of visitors, including NGOs and 
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some high level representatives – these indicated that States Parties were paying serious attention 
to the BWC Review Conference.  
The speaker said that, having read the working papers and proposals, there were common ground 
and differences. These contributions and the various workshops that had taken place pointed to a 
number of key topics, including, in no particularly order:  
 The Intersessional process: although there was general agreement on having some form of 
future intersessional process there was not yet agreement on whether we should continue 
with the current system or adopt some form of different approach.  
 Confidence Building Measures (CBM): No one suggested that CBMs should be stopped; 
however, there had been discussion on whether, and if so, how CBMs can be modified. This 
was something that was much more complicated that initially expected and it remained an 
interesting issue.  
 Science and Technology: there was a general sense that there should be something more 
regular reviews of science and technology and a number of working papers pushed for this; 
however, there were differences in views on how this should be done or whether this should 
involve outside experts. There had been extensive discussions on this issue and the speaker 
noted that there were a number of different opinions on this topic.  
 Implementation Support Unit (ISU): the speaker stressed that it would be important to take 
a decision on the ISU, as the ISU mandate was due to expire. It was noted that the ISU had 
been widely appreciated and a decision was needed that linked the ISU to future activities, 
indeed the ISU future was dependent upon what tasks would be required under the Final 
Declaration of the Seventh Review Conference and the way the unit was financed.  
 Universality: this was an important issue for States Parties to try to push and one in which 
there was no difference in opinions between States Parties. However, there were other 
factors to consider that could have implications for how to approach universalization, such 
as the discussion on a Middle East WMD Free Zone, which is scheduled for the future.  
 Cooperation and Assistance: this was something that had been identified as important. In 
the early nineties this was less of a problem, but now it was seen as being of high 
importance. There had been many activities in this area but there were different views on 
how best to proceed in these areas.  
 Compliance and Verification: this was identified as a more difficult area and one in which 
States Parties would have to see how best they could make progress. The speaker noted that 
he had mainly heard realistic thoughts on this topic, but consensus was required and this 
was something that needed to be followed carefully.  
In the discussion session, a number of points were raised. One participant encouraged greater 
attention to the issue of national implementation. It was pointed out that in 2006, there had been a 
lot of discussion on an Action Plan for national implementation drawing from the approach of the 
OPCW but this was missing from the key areas identified for the Seventh Review Conference. Other 
participants pointed to the work of external organisations and NGOs in the area of national 
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implementation and questioned whether there were plans to bring national implementation “in 
house” to the ISU. It was said that to some extent national implementation was already a task of the 
ISU and that States Parties should help each other in this area.  
A second area of discussion was what would constitute success at the Seventh Review Conference 
and what would be the legacy of the Conference. It was pointed out by one participant that the 
history of the Convention was littered with failed opportunities and missed chances, with a gulf 
between what was desirable and what was achievable. Others were more positive about the 
Convention pointing to the extent of scientific participation and input and emphasising the entirely 
new relationship that had developed between BWC and scientists over the last decade. The 
intersessional process was identified as having played a key role in this area of engagement between 
different communities. In terms of the legacy, whilst it was argued that this would be determined by 
States Parties, there are a number of areas that were identified as being demonstrative of success. 
These included, inter alia, the development of CBMs; the allocation of time during Intersessional 
Process to the issue of science and technology; and the provision of guidance to some form of future 
Intersessional Process beyond the Review Conference. One participant pointed out that whatever 
happens, it will be important for States Parties to be able to say why things were different and why 
countries should take the step of joining and/or implementing the Convention.  
Interlinked with the above discussion on success, a third area of discussion was that of science and 
technology, or more specifically whether there was scope for some means of achieving greater 
governance of science through the BWC. It was pointed out that an appropriate balance in measures 
of scientific governance, such as legislation and education, was required and further activities must 
incorporate the views of the scientific community. Several participants pointed towards stronger 
action on education in this regard, with some participants calling for progress beyond the 
exhortations of 2006.  
Achieving Realistic Decisions at the Seventh BWC Review Conference in 2011 
The speaker in this session began by pointing out that there was widespread agreement on what 
topics would need to be addressed.  The speaker elaborated on the following key areas to set the 
scene.  
a. Universalization  of the Convention, it was pointed out that despite a sustained effort there 
remained 19 states that had neither signed nor acceded to the Convention and, whilst there 
has been some progress, much more was required over the next five years. To do this States 
Parties were encouraged to find a way of generating more sustained input. One option to 
achieve this could be some form of a troika bringing together the President of the Seventh 
Review Conference, the Chairman of the Committee of the Whole and the Chairman of the 
Drafting Committee, supported by ISU and Depository States, as a means of providing 
sustained high level attention. A second option could be could be a special representative 
that pushed forward Universalization .  
b. The Intersessional Process had been a useful mechanism for sharing information and ideas 
on certain topics, however, the BWC needed to move forward and it would be advantageous 
to develop standing working groups on subjects, such as science and technology, CBMs, and 
compliance. Annual meetings of States Parties should be able to request these standing 
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working groups carry out further work. This, it was said, leads one to the view that annual 
meetings should have some decision-making power as appropriate and based on consensus.  
c. National Implementation together with Education and Outreach was an area in which the 
BWC needed to move forward. The speaker stated he would like to see an action plan with a 
target of two-thirds of States Parties adopting effective national implementation legislation 
by the time of the Eighth Review Conference. On education and outreach, the speaker 
hoped the States Parties would be able to do more than encourage and exhort at this 
Review Conference. Instead, States Parties should take action to implement effective 
education and outreach in order to make sure all scientists are aware of the BWC and its 
obligations.  
d. On the Confidence-Building Measures regime, the speaker hoped that it would be possible 
to agree some modifications at the Seventh Review Conference together with the 
establishment of a standing working group to look at how the effectiveness of the CBM 
regime could be enhanced.  
e. In terms of advances in Science and Technology, it was said that under the present 
arrangements science and technology were not adequately discussed. The speaker noted 
that developments in S&T have important implications for all Articles of the Convention and 
argued that it would be important to set up a standing working group on S&T open to all 
States Parties. It was suggested that Synthetic Biology could be a topic to address in the first 
year.  
f. On International cooperation and assistance, he recommended that States Parties should 
establish a clearinghouse mechanism, such as that which existed on the same topics under 
the Convention on Biodiversity. Another approach could be to set up a standing working 
group on this topic.  
g. On the issue of compliance and demonstrating compliance, it was said that a standing 
working group on compliance could be established to facilitate a conceptual discussion on 
what measures could demonstrate compliance and look ahead to what sort of regime will be 
required over the decades ahead.  
h. Finally, on the issue of the Implementation Support Unit, it was pointed out that the ISU 
had received huge praise for its work and it was recognised that the unit is currently unable 
to deal with all requests made upon it. The speaker recalled that the ISU have said a staff of 
6 or 7 will be required to meet its existing mandate and additional staff would be needed 
should some of the proposed additional activities that have been flagged for discussion at 
the Seventh Review Conference be realised. As a minimum, the States Parties will need to 
agree the continuation of the ISU.  
The speaker concluded by pointing out that expectations for the Seventh Review Conference have 
been raised and the speaker hoped that States Parties would meet the call to achieve realistic 
ambitions.  
The presentation raised a number of areas of discussion. It was suggested that in terms of science 
and technology, overall greater advances had been made on the protective and defensive side, 
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through, for example, developments in prevention and therapy, or in the new realm of bioforensics.  
The latter was particularly important as it made the tracking of pathogens in new ways easier. This 
led some to conclude that, on the one hand, the risk of a state deliberately using biology as a 
weapon was decreasing, not least because any state doing so would have to expect retribution. On 
the other hand, there was a potential threat from criminals, hate groups and people with specific 
individual grievances, however the speaker went on to suggest that many of the key advances were 
not particularly useful to these sorts of groups. It was suggested that the actual situation was 
somewhat clouded by the media being more receptive to doom-laden prophecies and less receptive 
to a rational discussion on the positive aspects of science.  
In this regard, several participants agreed that, whilst discussion on the negative potential of new 
technologies should not be overlooked, the positive aspects of new technologies should be 
addressed. Several participants expressed support for some form of working group on science and 
technology to provide a means of institutionalised assessment of S&T during the intersessional 
process. The intersessional process (ISP) had been extraordinarily effective in the way it enabled 
diplomats, law enforcement officers, scientists and others to come together to discuss issues. In this 
regard, the ISP could usefully enable a balanced assessment of the positive and negative implications 
of developments in science and technology; as well as serving as a forum for engagement on codes 
and ethics. It was also noted that the issue of convergence between the two Conventions (the CWC 
and the BWC) was receiving more and more attention in The Hague, and the States Parties should 
work out ways to draw in the two communities to look at common issues.  
The concept of a troika to work on universality was also discussed. This notion received support 
from a number of participants as a means to keep people engaged as it would generate the 
expectation that something would be done. It was recognised that smaller states may not always 
share the same perception of threats; however, it was argued that the benefits of the BWC in terms 
of looking at disease had great resonance with smaller and bigger states alike. Nonetheless, it was 
accepted that in some cases it could be difficult to get measures through parliament and that strong 
rationales were needed for signing up to the BWC in this regard. One participant laid emphasis on 
universalization through regional and sub-regional groupings and it was suggested that it was no 
longer appropriate to think of the NAM as a block, but rather it was a collective of states from 
different regions, that had different interests. In the case of ASEAN-plus countries, there had been 
close engagement and a sense of working together as a regional team. This was something which 
should be encouraged as a means to get regions working together generally, and get neighbouring 
states to sign-up to the Convention specifically.  
Other participants underscored the importance of the Implementation Support Unit in achieving 
universality, suggesting that if you want universalization  and the other activities identified by the 
speakers, you really need to expand the ISU beyond the current three people. In short, it was 
suggested that if States Parties were serious about universality, they would need to be serious about 
the ISU and provide the necessary funds for the ISU expansion as well as a travel budget for staff to 
engage. Several participants agreed that expansion would have to be geographically representative, 
with others emphasising the importance of the ISU remaining under political control of the States 
Parties. Others said that the emerging networked model for the BWC integrated a number of 
different actors and expertise, and, as such, one overarching institution to control everything was 
less appropriate.  
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The issue of compliance was also discussed, with one participant recalling that the issue of 
compliance had been raised repeatedly in the series of BWC related workshops hosted by different 
organisations around the globe; however, the question of what constituted compliance remained 
unanswered and several participants emphasised a need for conceptual discussions about 
compliance. However, other participants suggested that the focus should be on action-orientated 
outcomes as opposed to philosophical discussions, stating that although they were not intrinsically 
against a discussion on compliance, States Parties would need to keep in mind the availability of 
resources and time. In this regard, the question was raised as to how States Parties could ensure 
sufficient time for proper discussion with action at the end of it, adding that there was a division 
between ideal and the achievable.  
On national implementation, the interim objective of two-thirds of states enacting national 
implementation by the time of the Eighth Review Conference was debated, with one participant 
contending that nothing short of full implementation the Convention would be suitable as an 
objective. It was also suggested that the implementation of national legislation takes both time and 
sustained attention by senior government officials in order to make effective progress.  
A. Implementation mechanisms 
 
i. The intersessional process 
The intersessional processes were outlined by one speaker who began by pointing out that there 
had been two intersessional processes: the first between 2003 to 2005; and the second between 
2007 to 2010. The topics for these processes had been selected by the preceding Review Conference 
and it was suggested that the processes had been very successful in sharing information on topics. 
However, all decisions had been left to the next Review Conference. At the Sixth Review Conference, 
States Parties simply noted conclusions and endorsed the consensus outcome documents. 
Accordingly, the speaker suggested that it was now time to move forward and do more. In this 
regard, it was suggested that there would be advantages in supporting the annual meetings by 
standing working groups on subjects, such as on CBMs, on science and technology and on 
compliance. The speaker suggested that the annual Meeting of States Parties should be able to 
request such standing working groups carry out further work.  For example, in the case of S&T, to be 
able to request the standing working group to consider particular topics at future meetings. 
Moreover, the annual Meeting of States Parties should have some decision making powers where 
appropriate and on the basis of consensus. 
The issue of the intersessional process was raised in other sessions with some participants pointing 
out that when the mandate for the ISP was first drafted the key phrase was ‘common understanding 
and effective action’, recalling that this had been something of a rescue operation to salvage 
something from the collapse of the Ad Hoc Group negotiations. Whilst the first two ISPs have done a 
lot on common understanding and the generation of shared understandings on different topics - 
something that the participants largely agreed they would like to preserve - what had been much 
less satisfactory was effective action. Accordingly, what was needed was a more dynamic process 
that enabled a degree of decision making to facilitate effective action. It was said that such a 
proposal would maintain the Review Conference as the supreme decision making body with 
Meetings of Experts (MXs) and MSPs taking action where agreed, for example, when dealing with 
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Article X issues. Some other participants echoed this proposal suggesting there should be nothing 
stopping States Parties making decisions between Review Conferences, should there be agreement; 
with others elaborating on this concept and proposing that a working group could make 
recommendations, which would be sent to an annual meeting of States Parties, which could make 
decisions in discrete situations. In contrast, other participants expressed concern over radical 
changes in the format of the ISP and the notion of decision making outside of the Review 
Conference. From this perspective, it was suggested by one participant that standing agenda items, 
that would address national implementation; S&T; CBM amendments; and other issues, might be 
one approach that would preserve aspects of past intersessional processes whilst encouraging focus 
on key issues in the future. Decision-making was also a source of concern for some participants 
particularly if a group or groups were tasked with reaching decisions outside of the Review 
Conference forum, because, it was suggested, this could generate legal issues, adding that for some 
quite small States Parties participation in these groups might be difficult.   
The substance of the intersessional process was also raised, with one participant recalling that the 
first ISP had been very much driven by concerns over terrorism, a factor that also served as a driver 
of greater engagement with scientists because the community was pressed by the terrorism 
discussion to do something. The participant suggested that this approach was of limited value and in 
future attention should be given to issues such as transparency, not just in biodefence programmes, 
but also in relation to scientific research taking place in academia and elsewhere. 
ii. Improving the Confidence-Building Measure regime 
The next session addressed the issue of Confidence Building Measures. The first speaker began by 
outlining how the Sixth Review Conference had resisted proposals to amend the CBMs by France and 
Switzerland. It had been recognised that the Seventh Review Conference needed to avoid the same 
outcome, and accordingly over the last three years there had been a concerted effort to discuss the 
CBM regime. This had been achieved through a series of workshops and subsequently an electronic 
exchange through an email platform discussion. However, despite this effort the speaker recognised 
that, in the spirit of ‘ambitious realism’, ambition and realism might need to be separated. The joint 
working paper tabled by Germany, Norway and Switzerland (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.9) for the Seventh 
Review Conference was identified as presenting a realistic approach that had emerged from the 
Geneva Forum meetings, which sought to engage with the individuals who would be involved in 
taking decisions at the Review Conference.  There were proposals to agree some amendments to the 
CBMs at the Review Conference and to address improving the CBM regime in a future intersessional 
type process.   
At the time of speaking, it was noted that a working paper by South Africa (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.19) 
stripped the proposals down and placed less of a reporting burden upon States Parties.6 There has 
also been a working paper by Belgium which proposes a CBM to provide information on Article X 
matters (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.6).7  Another issue was the availability to the public of CBMs and it was 
noted that currently 21 annual submissions are accessible,8 something which is important in creating 
transparency.   
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The second speaker provided an overview of how CBMs are used by States Parties. The speaker 
pointed out that CBMs are available in the restricted part of the ISU website; however it turned out 
that the number of States Parties that had accessed the restricted part of the BWC website was 
around 40 which was substantially less than the number of States Parties to the Convention and 
even less that the number of states who had submitted CBMs. The second speaker went on to look 
at how CBMs were used, pointing out that there is very little public information about what 
information in the CBM is used or how. The speaker suggested that CBMs have a number of utilities 
and provided several examples. One State Party produced an annual compliance report and 
information in other States Parties CBMs was used explicitly in that report. Another less formal and 
less public use of CBMs was as a component of compliance assessment. Other States Parties used 
CBMs as a means of keeping on top of national implementation related activities, thus the CBM was 
used as a way of seeing what is going on in other countries and identifying gaps in legislative 
requirements domestically. Yet other States Parties used other countries CBMs as a model for filling 
in their own CBMs. It was suggested the ISU used CBMs as a means of updating information on the 
state of national implementation. Based on the analysis conducted, the speaker developed a 
number of recommendations, and highlighted one: the idea of developing a CBM working group to 
take discussions forward during a future ISP. This group, it was suggested, would be tasked with 
more than enhancing the effectiveness of the current system, but rather should look at the bigger 
picture of how the CBM regime fits in with compliance assessment.   
The third speaker outlined a number of conceptual ideas for the Intersessional Process related to the 
CBMs. The speaker began by pointing out that there are two key criticisms of CBMs, the first is that 
of low participation and it was stressed that participation remains at around 46%. The second issue 
was the types of data that were acquired under the CBMs and the speaker included a plea that the 
focus should remain on topics of high relevance to the Convention, such as misuse of research; any 
work on biodefence; and any work on aerosols. In addition, it was suggested that contextual 
information would be important, such as providing a basic understanding of BSL facilities and the 
ability to mass produce agents. Focusing on these topics (rather than areas such as national 
implementation and Article X), it was argued, would enable clarity in other areas, particularly if such 
topics were subsequently discussed internally at the national level in a manner which brought in the 
NGO community, as is the case in Germany where there is a biannual exchange on, inter alia, aspects 
of the German biodefence program. Alternatively, these sorts of topics could be used by civil society 
to conduct an assessment, as has been done in the BWPP Monitor in 2010 and 2011.9 The speaker 
concluded by proposing that the Review Conference should make CBMs publically available unless 
there was a request otherwise. The transparency this would generate might have a positive effect 
as, it was suggested, States Parties sometimes need a little push to get their CBMs prepared and Civil 
Society could ask questions that could contribute to that push.  
The discussion on CBMs raised a number of issues and touched upon the historical objectives of 
CBMs; some of the limitations and shortcomings with the current process; and potential 
mechanisms to rectify the limitations with the current process. In terms of the history of CBMs, one 
participant reminded the group that CBMs were established at the Second Review Conference in 
order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicion and to improve 
international cooperation in biological activities. The participant thus suggested that there are two 
                                                          
9
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pillars: the first related to confidence, the second dealt with the promotion of cooperation. The 
participant argued that the second pillar had not been given due attention, and that there was a 
need to address this in greater detail. Other participants contested this reading of the history of 
CBMs, with one participant pointing out that in 1992 the States Parties began with the VEREX 
process, which took attention from CBMs because of the discussion on the importance of 
declarations under the Protocol. It was suggested that with the collapse of the Protocol negotiations 
came a shift in the orientation of agenda items and, in the absence of other transparency measures, 
the confidence-orientated pillar of CBMs became more important.  
Another participant suggested that CBMs actually predate the Second Review Conference and could 
be traced back in time to 1979 and the Sverdlovsk episode, which was an issue in 1980. By 1986, the 
primary reason for CBM forms A and B was a perceived need to firstly, declare laboratories; and 
secondly, provide a mechanism for transparency and the demonstration of compliance through 
transparency, whereas CBM forms C and D were about reassuring States Parties. By the time of the 
Ad Hoc Group, it was realised that transparency required declarations. The participant went on to 
argue that States Parties should not get distracted with a theological discussion on CBMs and instead 
recognise that they remained the best mechanism to build transparency in the current context. 
Others countered this idea, recalling there was a rich discussion in the 1990s on strengthening the 
Convention that discussed a number of tools that could be considered again in the future, adding 
that, CBMs should not be considered the only tool available to States Parties.  
In terms of the limitations in CBMs, one participant suggested there were a lack of incentives to 
participate and the process should be made more practical to ensure that States Parties get 
something out of their participation. Others queried whether the lack of participation related to 
incentives, arguing that CBMs should be viewed as a unilateral demonstration of compliance with 
the Convention.  
In relation to efforts to improve CBMs, it was suggested by one participant that there was currently 
a shift to try and use CBMs for as a substitute for efforts to achieve verification. Verification was 
something that, one participant argued, must be raised and there were limits to what could be done 
with CBMs without changing the nature of the measures from a CBM to a Declaration, suggesting 
that the wording was very delicate. Other participants raised the possibility of shifting from a red-
green system to green-red approach whereby CBMs would be made public unless States Parties 
requested otherwise. Alternatively, it was suggested that a more step-by-step approach to CBMs 
could be useful in which some forms were made available publicly with others subject to restricted 
access. This could be useful as some CBMs form lend themselves more easily to being publicly 
available, thus states could provide some forms openly and others restricted. Other approaches to 
confidence building were also raised, beginning with an elaboration on the German Biodefence 
Conference. It was noted that this meeting had been taking place in the 1990s and involved national 
and international participants in a discussion between government and other stakeholders. At the 
most recent meeting 50 people from 35 States participated in what remains the only conference of 
its kind.  
iii. The Implementation Support Unit (ISU)  
The first speaker in this session began by reiterating that the Implementation Support Unit had 
received universal praise. However, its mandate and existence cease at the Seventh Review 
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Conference unless States Parties are able to agree its continuation. Continuity was argued to be 
important and the speaker suggested the unit should be mandated to support the tasks set out in 
the Final Document. The speaker suggested it was important to recognize the relevance and value of 
close liaison with OPCW and with UNODA (New York) and consider both the issue of staffing as well 
as budget. Consideration of staffing and budget was identified as being particularly important and it 
was pointed out by the speaker that the currently staffing levels remained limited to the extent that 
the ISU was currently unable to accept between one-third and one-half of the requests it received to 
assist States Parties. Should States Parties require the ISU to carry out additional duties, such as 
maintaining a clearinghouse for cooperation and assistance, additional staff would be required. The 
speaker concluded by reiterating the importance of this resource for the BWC and suggested that 
realistically, States Parties should be looking towards a total of 10 to 20 staff.  
The presentation stimulated an interesting debate on the ISU in which a number of participants 
reiterated support for the ISU and raised a number of other issues including staff numbers versus 
expectations; flexibility and the ISU mandate; funding; the establishment of a formalised institution; 
geographical representation; and the core competencies of the ISU.  
Several participants recognised the time demands on the ISU and the corresponding need for more 
staff, particularly if there was an expectation that the ISU should be able to sustain campaigns to 
promote universality, improve CBMs, enhance national implementation, and increase cooperation 
and assistance. Others raised the suitability of the ISU to work on some of these issues, such as 
national implementation, pointing out that whilst the ISU could contribute to administrative tasks, 
such as the development of databases, working on implementation might be less appropriate. 
Moreover, one participant pointed out that NGOs have an established toolbox as well as experience 
in working on these issues. Accordingly, the participant questioned whether States Parties should 
seek the imprint of the UN on the work of national implementation, adding that this would mean 
expensive staff, the recreation of models of implementation and a new process of outreach. The 
participant suggested that such a model was unlikely to ever be as flexible as some of the current 
NGO work, which provided a one-stop shop for national implementation in the bio-context, as well 
as for chemical weapons and nuclear related legislation. Related to this point, some participants also 
expressed concerns over extending the mandate of the ISU too much, pointing out how the current 
system provided a degree of flexibility and suggesting that if the mandate was changed too much it 
could have potentially negative implications for the ISU’s flexibility. It was recognised that, from a 
practical perspective, agreement on the tasks that required attention in the future would very much 
determine the role of the ISU.  
Whilst there had been widespread support for the expansion of the ISU in the various workshops on 
the BWC, there was less evidence of on-the-record commitments by States Parties in support of 
expansion of the ISU and it was pointed out that with the ISU – as with other areas – there was a 
distinction between the ideal and the achievable. This was particularly acute in terms of the 
financing of the ISU and it was pointed out that in other arms control agreements spending had 
been cut, for example, there had been a 5% reduction in OPCW budget, which had been frozen for 
five years at least, so in real terms the OPCW budget was expected to drop by 15%. Despite these 
observations, one participant suggested the costs of a modest ISU expansion were relatively small. 
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Another participant pointed to some of the challenges of expanding the ISU, suggesting that adding 
three people could effectively be presented as doubling the ISU, which could generate concern. Even 
bigger numbers could generate managerial problems that did not apply to the current small, flexible 
set up. In this regard, it was suggested that the addition of two persons may be more realistic - thus 
making a total of five persons. This could be supported by EU joint action funding and participants 
were reminded that the EU was collectively the biggest funder, although in many cases the EU 
funded activities not linked to regular budgets. Other participants proposed expanding the 
biological-related expertise in the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, which, it was pointed out hosts 
the ISU although the ISU remains separate, reporting to the States Parties. Yet others still, suggested 
that the ISU remained an interim measure or a “band aid approach to the BWC”, with some 
suggesting that States Parties should aspire to either establish some form of permanent institutional 
structure or alternatively provide greater political backing to the ISU. Whatever approach was 
favoured it was agreed that further expansion must take into consideration geographical 
representation.  
In the final session of the first day, participants watched a video of the OPCW’s Challenge Inspection 
Exercise in 2011. This video is publicly available from YouTube and can be accessed through this link. 
iv. Improving education awareness and outreach  
The first speaker in the session on improving education awareness and outreach began by outlining 
some of the past activities undertaken in relation to dual use education. The speaker drew specific 
attention to the US National Academy of Sciences Warsaw workshop on Dual Use Education in 2009 
and some of the conclusions from this meeting, which recommended that dual–use education 
needed to be embedded in the life science curriculum around the world. It was said that there was a 
real opportunity to frame dual use as part of a broader contemporaneous discussion on social 
responsibly and science. The speaker said there was growing international recognition of the need to 
promote security issues and recognition that existing culture needs to be strengthened and made 
more active. The increasingly active discussion on professional responsibility in science offered a 
suitable place to slot security related discussion into and should be done in a manner in which 
science and scientists are framed as part of the solution not the problem. The speaker pointed to a 
number of initiatives from scientific community and governments, suggested the former were 
particularly important, before reiterating the importance of dual use biosecurity becoming a part of 
the broader discussion on science responsibility, something which could be reinforced with 
complementary focused efforts and materials that were more BWC specific. The speaker concluded 
by stating that the intersessional processes had been important in engaging the scientific community 
and it was hoped that whatever the outcome of the Review Conference, there would continue to be 
opportunities for engagement between the security and scientific communities.  
The second speaker presented an analysis of dual use education opportunities and survey results, 
specifically pointing to information on attitudes and opinions of scientists. The speaker outlined 
some of the lessons learned from these initiatives, drawing specific attention to three issues as being 
particularly important: firstly, ensuring adequate balance of security concerns and freedom of 
research; secondly, tailoring materials to local contexts and requirements; and thirdly, taking into 
consideration the issue of terminology, particularly when working across different languages. The 
speaker then underlined the importance of ensuring sustainability in educational initiatives, before 
proposing concrete actions that could be considered at the Review Conference, specifically: 
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integrating education as a crosscutting topic in the ISP and developing a BWC education and 
outreach action plan.  
The third speaker pointed to how States Parties have repeatedly underscored the fundamental role 
of education in strengthening the BWC, something most recently evidenced in the jointly authored  
working paper [BWC/CONF.VII/WP.20] on this topic, which included the experience of a number of 
countries from a wide range of regional groups under the BWC. It was suggested that States Parties 
to the BWC are now in a better position to move forward having demonstrated that education is 
possible and can be achieved at relatively little cost. The speaker went on to identify a number of 
actions that could be undertaken to achieve specific objectives, as well as presenting additional 
mechanism through which education could be taken forward, including the use of CBMs to report 
educational activities and the integration of education into a future intersessional process discussion 
on Science and Technology (S&T).  
The session on education generated a lively discussion covering a number of issues related to 
education and awareness raising; as well as several related topics, specifically whistle blowing and 
publications. On the issue of education and awareness, firstly, there was some debate as to how 
best to approach this issue at the Review Conference and what bundle of activity this could best be 
integrated within. From a practical perspective, it was suggested that the topic was most closely 
aligned with science and technology; however, some participants felt that monitoring educational 
activities would be better transferred to some form of national implementation working group as a 
means to follow who was doing what, where and how. Others suggested there was a link between 
legislation and education, in that States Parties need to educate scientists as well as enacting 
national legislation and it was suggested that this might become easier with the Bologna process 
seeking to make academic standards more comparable.  
A second issue that was raised was whether education type activities should be voluntary or 
mandatory, one participant proposed that at least some of these sort of activities should be 
mandatory, adding that scientists could have a code which they must sign and adhere to. However, 
it was argued that mandatory approaches could be more difficult to implement. A third issue related 
to the activities of the OPCW, and it was pointed out that the OPCW recently agreed to establish a 
working group on this topic and that there could be a role for exchanging ideas at different levels in 
this regard, including through scientist exchanges. However, other participants suggested that the 
extent of awareness of dual use issues amongst chemists was likely to be the same as with 
biologists, adding that it would be unlikely that chemists would be familiar with the CWC. 
Nonetheless, several participants recognised that linking the activities in this area under the BWC 
with those in the CWC would be a useful process.  
Thirdly, there were a number of proposals identified for promoting education in the future. One 
participant pointed to the role of social media in promoting education and outreach to a younger 
audience. Another participant suggested there could be scope for approaching Chief Scientific 
Advisers or Ministers and their equivalents on this issue in the hope they could drive things forward 
at the national level through contacting universities. Another participant raised the issue of whistle 
blowing, and it was suggested that creating a mechanism to facilitate whistle blowing could be 
considered a national duty.  
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In an additional presentation in this session, a fourth speaker spoke on some of the institutional 
challenges that arose following the US Anthrax Letters Attacks and the subsequent investigation. The 
speaker began with some information on U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases 
(USAMRIID), pointing out that the institution had had a more peacefully orientated public health role 
in its early days. However, events in 1979, specifically the Sverdlovsk outbreak, affected the nature 
of the work. It was during this period that Bruce Ivins arrived at USAMRIID after being hired to work 
on anthrax.  
The speaker outlined aspects of the investigation into the Anthrax Letter Attacks pointing out that, 
the contents of the September 2001 mailing were brought to USAMRIID for investigation where it 
was identified as being the Ames strain, a variant that, since 1992 has primarily been studied at 
USAMRIID Fort Detrick. The speaker said that rather than the FBI taking a step back to identify a 
broad pool of potential suspects that would have included those working on Anthrax in Fort Detrick, 
the FBI had succumbed to what the speaker described as ‘institutional blindness’ and failed to fully 
consider an insider threat. This was rectified only later in the investigation.  
The speaker noted that the event raised the question of accountability in the event of a disaster, 
saying that in this case, something had gone wrong in terms of judging who the insider was. The 
speaker went on to suggest that the event raised the issue of institutional values and process in 
place within USAMRIID. In this regard, the speaker suggested it was remarkable that USAMRIID 
appeared to have ignored or not employed personnel reliability screening of persons working with 
dangerous pathogens; instead, there was a misplaced sense of presumed patriotism and loyalty. 
Finally, the speaker raised the broader issue of a criminal investigation in conditions in which 
institutional blindness had prevailed and reiterated that it had taken the FBI years to ask the army 
the tough questions that were required, and only then was this done as a result of the scientific 
contribution to the evidence.  
The presentation raised a number of issues. One participant noted that it is hard to identify mental 
problems and the regulations make it difficult to gain access to medical records, a process that 
complicates the extent to which an individual’s mental health can be monitored. Another participant 
noted that Ivins had, in fact, signed a waiver giving the Army access to his medical records but that  
USAMRIID authorities had apparently not considered him to be safety or security risk The speaker 
said that Ivins' medical records were clearly indicative of mental difficulties. It was also suggested 
that personnel reliability programs can never be 100% foolproof and there is always a human 
element to their implementation. However, other participants pointed out that security vetting for 
work in nuclear programmes was required in the US, suggesting vetting would be possible to some 
extent and, as one participant pointed out, a presumption that bio was not that much of a threat 
compared to nuclear, a situation which suggests a disconnect in security policies.  Another 
participant noted that the clearance procedure is meant primarily to protect secrets and that 
information about nuclear weapons is generally kept secret while much work on select agents is not 
secret and therefore has not required security clearance. Other participants indicated that aspects of 
the evidence are not enough alone to establish a conviction, and there is a need to establish a 
connection between the materials and access. Another participant pointed to a parallel experience 
dealing with public concerns over animal testing in the UK in which the response was to operate in a 
manner which was whiter than white. The participant expressed hope that USAMRIID would 
establish records of who has access to strains and therefore, should there be a similar incident it 
19 
 
would be possible to immediately identify the team who worked on any specific strain. Other 
participants raised the issue of maintaining reliability and oversight on an individual basis and 
questioned what should have been done to identify problems earlier.  
In a summary response, the speaker indicated that the case against Ivins remains subject to a 
number of questions and has been subjected to a great deal of disinformation and uncertainty which 
had been compounded by several reports on this topic that had a political back story. The speaker’s 
personal sense was that the match between the morphological signature of the spores in the flask 
maintained by Ivins and the signature of the spores in the letters, together with other aspects of the 
FBI charge would have made a strong case to go to trial. More significantly though, were the 
institutional failings and the fact the US Army never accepted responsibility with much of the blame 
being directed towards the FBIs investigative failures. This buried an important aspect of 
accountability for an event that affected not just the five victims who died and their families, but 
also shut down government in what is one of the few major acts of bioterrorism. In addition to the 
deaths, it has had profound implications in terms of biosecurity and bioterrorism thinking and much 
of the interest of industry, government and academia can probably be traced back to these letters. A 
further result of the FBI investigation, of great potential value, was the development of greatly 
improved forensic technologies.  
B.   Enduring challenges to the Convention 
i. Advances in Science and Technology relevant to the Convention  
The first speaker in the session on science and technology suggested that the advance of science and 
technology and the immensity and complexity of the knowledge gained through this process had 
rendered this topic both incredibly complex and of critical importance given some of the risks 
involved. The challenge was compounded by the absence of adequate compliance assurance 
mechanisms and a lag in the development and implementation of oversight mechanisms and 
educational programs.  
The speaker proceeded to illustrate this point through the research on Bird Flu, citing Ron Fouchier, 
the head of the group based at the Erasmus Medical Center in Rotterdam that had been leading the 
research in Europe as stating that “this is probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can 
make”. The speaker went on to highlight key areas of potential concern which included targeted 
delivery systems; synthetic biology; systems biology; genomics; bioinformatics and computational 
biology. These examples led to a number of biosecurity concerns, particularly in terms of state-
supported actors, and underscored a need for a new process of assessing and dealing with the 
advances in science and technology.  
The speaker went on to highlight some of the remarks made by other scholars in this field, 
suggesting that the incremental approach had reached the end of its useful life. Subsequently, the 
speaker outlined some of the calls for improving the review of S&T developments at the Seventh 
BWC Review Conference referring to the papers submitted by the States Parties containing calls for a 
new S&T assessment process and the different perspectives on the issues of frequency of 
assessment, the type of assessment body, and items to be covered by the S&T review group. The 
speaker suggested that these papers reflected an increased concern about the risks such 
developments pose in regard to biological weapons and the necessity of dealing with these in a 
more analytical, systematic way. The speaker concluded by looking at some of the similarities and 
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differences evident in these papers and suggested there were a lot of good ideas to help improve 
the consideration of S&T advances specifically through the development of a working group. Such a 
group should be composed of government experts, scientists from civil society institutions and 
industry to carry out a structured, systematic and analytical review of  S&T developments of 
relevance to the Convention. Such a group, the speaker proposed should meet at least once a year, 
but maintain the flexibility of meeting more often if deemed necessary. It was suggested that a 
Facilitator to chair the working group should be chosen by a regional group and supported by 
Deputies, to be selected by other regional groups. Such an approach could help with reviewing S&T 
as well as dealing with implementation and oversight, education and awareness raising. In terms of 
the latter, the speaker concluded by proposing that one approach would be to agree that States 
Parties provide annual reports on the steps they have taken nationally to improve education and 
oversight of work in the life sciences, for example as a part of their submissions under CBM E.  
The second speaker highlighted some of the key themes to emerge from a 3-day Workshop on 
Trends in Science and Technology Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention, held in November 
2010, hosted by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. The speaker drew specific attention to 
three key findings highlighted in the report produced by the National Academy of Sciences:10  
 The continuing rapid pace of change in which life sciences research is advancing very rapidly 
and will continue to do so. The speaker drew particular attention to the rapid increase in 
availability and power of enabling technologies such as computing and high throughput 
analysis that underpin life sciences research 
 Diffusion of life sciences research and capacity in which there was an ever larger number of 
international collaborations and globalization of scientific culture which brought in life 
science researchers outside of traditional research institutions 
 The increasing integration and convergence of life science in which modern life sciences 
research is multidisciplinary and integrative resulting in a degree of diversity in the fields of 
research of relevance to the future of the BWC.  
The speaker went on to highlight a number of examples, such as developments in immunology and 
advances in biosensors for detection and diagnosis. The latter, it was argued, provided an example 
of the positive implications of developments in Science and Technology for the Convention as it had 
potential for improved response to events, although it was recognized that there were limitations to 
be overcome regarding specificity, integration, speed, etc.  
The speaker went on to discuss some of implications for the Convention that were identified in the 
report including the finding that nothing had been identified as being outside scope of Article I. It 
was also noted that S&T developments and trends affect several Articles of BWC. This underlined the 
importance of continuing to evaluate advances in S&T and a number of issues surrounding such an 
evaluation were identified including the relationship such reviews would have with international 
scientific organizations, and the roles of scientists from academia, industry, and government.  
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The third speaker began with an overview of one case study technology, that of vaccine production 
technologies, which was used to illustrate the global distribution of some life science technologies 
and the extent of transnational co-authorship in certain areas. This reinforced the point that many 
aspects of science and technology of relevance to the Convention are: globally, if unevenly, 
distributed; increasingly collaborative; and increasingly interconnected, in the sense that a 
development in one region can have implications for another region. The speaker agreed that in 
terms of the BWC, it was clear that developments in S&T have positive and negative implications for 
a number of different Articles of the Convention; but also affect some of the existing process that 
occur under the Convention, such as transparency measures, which were influenced by the scientific 
landscape and trends in research and development. The speaker suggested that as S&T was 
pervasive in many aspects of the Convention this made monitoring S&T so important, something 
reflected in the large number of states that have over time referred to the need to do something in 
relation to S&T reviews, although exactly what remained unclear. The speaker said that if States 
parties were serious about doing something on science and technology there were a number of 
points to consider:  
 Why bother. It was pointed out that there were various perceptions of why S&T reviews 
should be conducted. The most frequently cited objective of the process was to “keep 
abreast of developments in order to avoid the misuse of microorganisms, pathogens and 
other S&T developments”; however, there were a number of other views including the 
implications of S&T developments for education, national implementation or Article X.  
 Frequency. Whilst it was accepted that the Review Conference five yearly S&T review 
process should continue, it was recognised that there was agreement that more frequent 
reviews are needed.  
 Process. A frequently mentioned model of S&T advice was the CWC’s Scientific Advisory 
Board (SAB). However, a direct transfer of this model into the BWC context was rejected by 
participants because of structural differences and there was much greater support in the 
BWC context for a group open to all States Parties.  
 Substance. There appeared to be support for looking at a different subject each year; this 
could topical (synthetic biology, nano, neuro) or could be thematic, for example, looking at 
science and technology relating to attribution (including forensics); science and technology 
relating to protection;  
 Who. There was strong support for the idea that external participation from the scientific 
and industrial communities would be important, although less clarity in how this could be 
achieved and funded.  
The speaker then drew attention to a number of other points to consider including: leadership and 
having an individual to frame and focus discussion; the limitations of consensus – in scientific 
discussions; the difficult of communicating science to policy makers; and the role of 
recommendations. The speaker concluded by stating that enhancing the S&T review process is 
something that is innocuous, doable and valuable. It was argued that at the Review Conference, it 
would not be necessary to decide the minutiae, but it would be important to think through the 
basics and ensure that whatever is agreed sets the Convention off on the right track. 
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The fourth speaker presented a number of ideas as to how States Parties might structure the 
consideration of science and technology evaluations in the future. The speaker proposed that S&T-
related activity was important and would serve to maintain and strengthen the capacity of the 
regime to recognize and respond to possible compliance concern, and would simultaneously 
enhance economic cooperation and development. The speaker then underlined the importance of 
achieving a greater common understanding on the scope and nature of S&T reviews from a variety 
of contexts including: firstly, the broader national security context, which, whilst outside the BWC 
focus per se, could nonetheless include whistle blower mechanisms and a broader discussion on 
legal review mechanisms associated with program activity. Secondly, a review of the economic 
cooperation and development context. Thirdly, looking at the methodologies used in the awarding 
of patents and the secrecy policies associated with some categories of patents. A fourth basket could 
consist of methodologies for the assessment of scientific training and research in the life sciences 
and associated enabling technologies. Applied to BWC as a whole, looking into these areas could 
provide some basis from discussion, rather than developing a laundry list of topics for an 
intersessional process which should be avoided, and add some structure and direction on S&T.  
The discussion on science and technology raised a number of different issues including a discussion 
on the recent bird flu experiments and the broader issue of research oversight as well as some of the 
challenges and potentials for reviewing S&T in the BWC and the role of external actors, particularly 
industry and the scientific community in reviewing S&T. On the issue of the bird flu experiments, it 
was pointed out that one of the research experiments was carried out at research institutes within 
the Netherlands, a country that had taken a lead on issues such as codes of conduct. Accordingly, 
one participant questioned whether these measures needed to be reinforced by education and 
awareness raising prior to the development of codes and whether governments had a responsibility 
to deal with these issues under Article IV of the BWC. Others suggested that aspects of this research 
were important and it could be argued that the risks were actually acceptable if the results yielded 
valuable insights for public health reasons. In contrast, others suggested the experiment could 
create both a roadmap for weapons development and a small reservoir of materials that could be 
leaked or stolen. Yet others still pointed to the challenges the experiment raises in terms of 
sensationalised news reporting and the difficulties this generated in terms of communicating 
scientific issues to the public, adding that an evaluation became much more difficult in the absence 
of scientific literacy. The view was expressed that only by properly safeguarded scientific 
investigation of dangerous pathogens can we develop diagnostics and therapies against potentially 
devastating pandemics whether of natural or unnatural occurrence. 
On the topic of oversight, one participant raised a conceptual query over what was understood by 
oversight suggesting this has a number of meanings depending on who is doing the overseeing and 
whether it is applied institutionally or otherwise. It was suggested that the BWC had a role to play in 
the oversight discussion but to achieve this, States Parties would need to find a way to open doors to 
participation from a broad range of civil society actors. It was pointed out that in some countries 
such as the UK, there were procedures in place which necessitated oversight was applied at all 
stages from the beginning of the project through the process of execution and up to the point of 
publication, and that this was facilitated by a set of general principles that researchers at least those 
working on UK Ministry of Defence projects, were required to address. The participant went on to 
suggest that this was an issue that could be dealt with as part of an S&T panel discussion.  
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The issue of reviewing S&T at the Review Conference and beyond was also raised with several 
participants drawing attention to some of the challenges in S&T reviews under the Convention 
highlighting specifically how there were clear limitations on what could be expected of a three-week 
exercise involving policy makers. In this regard, others suggested a simplified approach might be 
required to facilitate the engagement of policy makers with these issues. In terms of options and 
proposals, it was agreed that the Review Conference should aim to do something more frequently, 
with some participants laying emphasis on the development of an open-ended body to look at S&T 
rather than a static model. The issue of participation was also raised and led to a discussion of how 
States Parties could best work with the scientific community in the framework of the BWC. On the 
one hand, some participants considered that there were limits to the extent that scientists could be 
involved in the political aspects of the discussions on the implications for the Convention, 
particularly in circumstances where there would be decision making. On the other hand, a number 
of participants explicitly supported working more closely with the scientific community and industry 
representatives, not least because these actors were best placed to determine what is going to 
happen in the future. In this regard, it was suggested that there was a need to find a way to have 
open doors and participation from a broad range of civil society. 
ii. International cooperation.    
The first speaker in the session on international cooperation began by recalling language from the 
2006 Final Declaration in which:  
48. The Conference reaffirms that existing institutional ways and means of ensuring 
multilateral cooperation among all States Parties need to be developed further in order to 
promote international cooperation for peaceful uses in areas relevant to the Convention, 
including such areas as medicine, public health, agriculture and the environment. 
The speaker then proceeded to draw attention to the NAM working paper (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.26), 
which sought the establishment of a mechanism for the full implementation of Article X.11 The 
speaker went on to highlight how the 2009 Meeting of States Parties had reaffirmed the role the ISU 
could play as a clearing-house for information on needs for, and sources of, assistance and 
cooperation. This was in line with earlier proposals that drew attention to the role of a clearing 
house under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, and, it was suggested that this could most 
effectively be achieved through a two-stage mechanism. This would consist, firstly, of a database 
developed by the ISU for requests and offers of assistance; and secondly, an open-ended working 
group that would meet for one day during the annual Meeting of Experts to receive a report from 
the ISU on the database and briefings by States Parties on cooperation. It was suggested that an ISU 
clearing house mechanism would be an effective step forward, particularly if coupled with annual 
reports by ISU, which could be discussed and considered in an annual Meeting of States Parties.  
The second speaker spoke on the evolution of international cooperation in relation to national 
implementation. The speaker identified a number of assistance packages used by the IAEA and the 
OPCW and pointed out that these providers of assistance often operated in situations in which 
legislation for chemical, biological and nuclear issues remained separate. In this regard, one 
approach could be to encourage greater coordination between the different spheres. The speaker 
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 Cuba on behalf of the NAM (2011) “The establishment of a mechanism to promote the full effective and 
non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention”, BWC/CONF.VII/WP.26 
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pointed out that organisations such as VERTIC, which had been working with the OSCE, the EU CBRN 
Centres of Excellence and the UNSC Resolution 1540 committee, were seeking to expand and move 
into other areas, thus approaching the legislative side of national implementation in a more 
coordinated manner. This was a result of some states indicating that they wished to implement 
legislation on all areas at once; an approach which, the speaker suggested, made a lot of sense, 
particularly with smaller countries. The speaker thus proposed that there could be an evolution 
towards a more comprehensive approach to the provision assistance. This was not something that 
could readily be achieved by organisations such as IAEA or the OPCW because of the limitations 
within their mandate which preclude working on several different areas. Nonetheless, it should not 
be seen as a barrier to a broader approach to CBRN legislation where and when appropriate.  
The final speaker in this session began by pointing to the historical disparity in the attention that had 
been given to a compliance regime on the one hand, and the attention given to international 
cooperation and assistance on the other suggesting the former had had more attention than the 
latter. It was said that Article X had been given limited attention up until the VEREX era; but had 
received more attention since the inception of work in the Ad Hoc Group. The speaker cited 
scholarly work on this issue that pointed to how the Article X discussion has been ‘justicized’12 and 
moving forward with the discussion would be important. To achieve this there were both conceptual 
and practical issues that needed to be addressed. In terms of conceptual issues a number of factors 
needed to be recognised. Firstly, that the BWC is primarily a disarmament treaty and not a 
development treaty; secondly, that there needs to be an appropriate balance between disarmament 
and development so that countries in need of technology can obtain this from countries with 
technology. Thirdly, striking the right balance will ensure that the BWC offers incentives for States 
Parties to participate even if BW is not regarded as a serious threat; and fourthly, there is already a 
considerable amount of scientific and technical cooperation and sizeable development assistance 
aid.  
In terms of practical issues it was suggested that there was a need to identify what should be 
addressed under technical cooperation in the BWC context, and specifically what this should include: 
national implementation; customs controls; biosafety/biosecurity; disease surveillance, or the life 
sciences more generally. The speaker concluded by noting that there were practical developments 
such as databases, which would be uncontroversial yet help to improve the development angle. The 
speaker then identified some areas where cooperation could be more forthcoming, such as 
cooperation in terms of national implementation, disease surveillance or on customs related issues; 
but acknowledged that others areas could be more difficult. Nonetheless, the speaker concluded the 
difficulties involved should not detract from dealing with Article X related issues as this would 
inevitably form part of the discussion and getting seriously involved in the debate was most 
important in order to facilitate the implementation of Article X. 
In the discussion on international cooperation, it was suggested that such a holistic approach to 
legislation that covered CBR and N could be suited to some countries. It was pointed out that 
cooperation on implementation remained different to the issue of cooperation in terms of Article X. 
Whilst both were important, participants recognised that the latter point was going to be an issue at 
the Review Conference. Indeed, although it was suggested that there had been a great deal of 
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international cooperation, there was less evidence of how Article X could be addressed at the 
Review Conference. Two specific proposals were discussed: the first was the notion of a clearing 
house, which was generally accepted as one practical step that could be pursued. In addition, it was 
recalled that the NAM paper (BWC/CONF.VII/WP.26) on the establishment of a mechanism to 
promote the full effective and non-discriminatory implementation of Article X of the Convention,13 
proposed inter alia, the establishment of:  
… a mechanism that would allow States Parties to facilitate the broadest possible transfer 
and exchange of materials and scientific and technological information regarding the use of 
bacteriological (biological) and toxin agents for peaceful purposes, as well as exercise the 
right to participate in these exchanges … 
It was suggested that the establishment of such a mechanism would provide a non-discriminatory 
procedure for transfers and facilitate the resolution of disputes under Article X, particularly in the 
case of a transfer denial. This proposal generated a number of comments, and it was pointed out 
that Article X does not include the word transfer with another participant cautioning against the 
politicisation of export denials, suggesting that it would be more constructive to focus on how best 
to do cooperation.  
Other participants drew attention to Article VII, suggesting there was an linkage between Article X 
and Article VII, although the latter was more orientated towards capacity building, it was something 
which required further attention. Another area of discussion noted the approaches taken towards 
cooperation in the CWC arena, where it was pointed out that there was a growing willingness to 
engage with this issue. Moreover, the CSP had recently agreed a decision on components of an 
agreed framework for Article XI of the CWC, alongside a process of enhancing databases and clearing 
houses.  
iii. Demonstrating compliance and developing confidence in compliance 
The first speaker opened the session on demonstrating compliance and developing confidence in 
compliance, by reiterating previous agreements in which States Parties stressed the importance of 
consultation in this area. The speaker suggested that successive workshops in the run up to the 
Seventh Review Conference in, inter alia,  Beijing, Montreux, Berlin, Manila and Clingendael, 
indicated that there is broad consensus around compliance as being one of the issues to address. 
One specific idea was identified as emerging from the Montreux workshop, which was to have a 
Compliance working group that would report to the annual Meetings of States Parties during the 
intersessional period from 2011 to 2016. The speaker suggested that such a working group would 
need to have a conceptual discussion about enhanced mechanisms to enable each State Party to 
demonstrate compliance with the Convention, and also to improve confidence that other States 
Parties are in compliance. The group could review the significant changes in the world since the 
1990s and look ahead to 2020 so as to identify and examine what sort of mechanisms should be in 
place by that stage to build confidence in compliance. This, it was suggested, could be followed by a 
piecemeal approach in which different elements of compliance monitoring might be evaluated 
experimentally by States Parties. The speaker then emphasised the importance of keeping separate 
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considerations, on the one hand, of how the existing CBM regime can be strengthened and 
enhanced and, on the other hand, how compliance could be demonstrated and confidence in 
compliance developed. The proposal made by Australia, Japan and New 
Zealand14(BWC/CONF.VII/WP.11) for a separate standing working group to address compliance 
issues was identified as a significant, sensible and measured step forward in this regard.  
The next speaker spoke on the issue of compliance and the development of oversight regimes and 
began with an overview of the US context. It was stated that the in the last fiscal year funding was 
distributed to a large number of groups and subject to a number of different compliance oversight 
regimes run by inter alia the military, the Department of Homeland Security and the intelligence 
community which in turn had a number of sub-regimes. These systems vary from agency to agency 
and remain compartmentalised with a lack harmonisation and the specifics of institutional 
procedures for oversight unclear. One of the more developed models identified was that of the 
Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) Compliance Review Group (CRG) which reviewed 
proposed research for compliance the BWC and US law. Under this system project proposals are 
reviewed and categorised in four groups: 
 In the first category are projects, which neither raise compliance concerns nor fall within the 
NSABB category of experiments of concern with regard to biosafety.  
 In the second category are those experiments that might mistakenly appear to raise such 
concerns but which do not actually do so.  
 In the third category are those research proposals which are considered to represent an 
issue with compliance with arms control agreements or to fall within the category of NSABB 
concern  
 A fourth category covers projects that are beyond the pale and thus completely prohibited.  
 
The speaker went on to suggest that DHS oversight system represented a useful method for 
reviewing compliance. The speaker proceeded to propose that these systems could be discussed at a 
Meeting of States Parties, with the objective of exchanging of best practice on oversight under 
Article IV of the BWC. This could be supplemented with an exchange on the procedures used in 
assessments of compliance and a meeting of compliance officers and individuals responsible for 
oversight, with the intention of preparing written guidelines and summaries with respect to the 
BWC. The speaker concluded by suggesting that there would be a number of benefits to this 
approach: it could generate political momentum and reflection amongst States Parties and provide 
assurances that research was being adequately monitored.  
The final speaker discussed the issue of verification and compliance under the BWC. The speaker 
began with two conceptual points: the first related to what needed to be assessed in terms of 
compliance and it was pointed out that thinking about compliance-assessment mechanisms for the 
BTWC requires clarification of what actions constitute compliance or non-compliance. The second 
point related to the different conceptualisations of terms that were used and it was suggested that 
there was a semantic swamp with terms viewed differently amongst different individuals. The point 
being that although the term verification is widely used, there were many different understandings 
as to what this term means.   
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In terms of verification and compliance, the speaker noted there had been a number of statements 
that mentioned verification including from the NAM, the EU and the Russian Federation and there 
appeared to be a broad consensus this is a useful concept for the Convention. However, the problem 
was that there were different understandings of what might and should be verified. The speaker 
went on to identify elements that would be necessary for a verification and compliance system 
beginning with the question of what database would be necessary. Such a database, it was 
suggested could be based on that provided by the CBMs, but would need to contain more 
information than that available in the CBMs. At the other end of the verification and compliance 
spectrum, it was suggested that there was a need for challenge inspections to look at serious cases 
of suspected non compliance. Concerning challenge inspections, the UN Secretary General’s 
Investigatory Mechanism already existed, although there would need to be clarification of the 
relationship between the BWC and this mechanism. A third ‘mid-level element’ that fell between 
politically highly charged challenge investigations and day-to-day information monitoring was that of 
a consultative mechanism. The speaker recalled that this already existed in the form of the 
consultative mechanism under the BWC’s Article V and had been invoked in the past in the Thrips 
palmi investigation.  
On the consultative mechanism, it was noted that there could well be difficulties in making 
consultations between States Parties public from the outset and that progress in such consultation 
requires both States Parties to keep the consultation private as  premature publicity can cause 
problems in making progress on the consultations.  In this regard, one participant said that caution 
was required in considering whether to publicise consultations from the outset, as it could be 
detrimental if States Parties were to compromise the possibility of quiet resolution by pushing too 
hard for transparency, something echoed by other participants who suggested in some cases it was 
more effective to engage in private consultations, rather than following the more aggressive 
approach of calling for an investigation. 
The need for a conceptual discussion on compliance was raised by some participants with one 
suggesting there was a need to work out what was meant by compliance particularly in relation to 
CBMs and it was proposed that this could be addressed through a working group. One 
understanding was that compliance should be understood as having someone outside looking in, 
and there was a need to think about procedures that could support this; with the participant adding 
that it could be possible to begin to use the existing softer tools, such as a database and the 
consultancy mechanism to start the discussion. Encouragement to make CBMs publicly available was 
raised as another route to moving forward on compliance, with one participant suggesting that more 
attention to oversight could detract from CBMs. In contrast, other participants decoupled CBMs 
from compliance recalling that CBMs were intended to prevent confusion and ambiguity.  Several 
participants considered that an incremental approach was more suitable and feasible for the BWC.  
The issue of oversight was also raised again with one participant questioning whether there had 
been readover into oversight mechanisms in other areas, specifically chemical and nuclear weapons. 
Two UK examples were identified: the establishment of an independent nuclear weapons safety 
committee outside of government; and the creation of an independent group to review research 
programmes in chemistry, which included a medical subcommittee that had evaluated riot control 
agents to make sure that they are safe. The original Canadian accountability framework proposals 
were also recalled as an example of a possible model that had not been taken forward.  
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iv. Achieving universality 
The final session began with a presentation on achieving BWC universality in the Pacific region. It 
was observed that seven Pacific states have neither signed nor ratified the BWC, although the 
Marshall Islands recently indicated that it would adopt legislation authorizing BWC accession in early 
2012. The presenter proceeded to outline some of the challenges to countries in the region and it 
was said that, whilst none of the states in the region were believed to be opposed to the BWC on 
political grounds, economic and security issues were a reason for Pacific states' passivity towards the 
BWC. This was compounded by a lack of capacity to consider, internally promote, adopt and enforce 
the treaty, particularly when the BW threat was perceived as low when compared with other issues. 
This was further exacerbated by the very low population numbers and their staggering geographic 
remoteness from other countries and regions geographically, but also metaphorically, from the BWC 
meetings in Geneva.  
In this regard, it was suggested that a different approach could be useful to encouraging 
participation and the author cited a recent study, which pointed to four options: 
 wholesale ratification (decide to join all outstanding treaties in one issue area at once); 
  selective ratification (make a choice about which are most pressing and relevant);  
 a moratorium on ratification (a conscious decision in response to being overburdened); and 
 adopting an alternative  framework (such as a regional approach to norm setting, 
monitoring and enforcement to ensure relevance and reduce overburdening small 
bureaucracies) 
The speaker suggested that ‘wholesale ratification’ could minimise the overburdening but raised the 
question of which bundle of treaties the BWC might be packaged with, whilst one fruitful approach 
could be to link BWC implementation with health and IHR implementation, any attempt to bundle 
the BWC with unrelated agreements may be more difficult than it is worth. In this regard, elements 
of an ‘alternative framework’ were suggested as particularly useful if they supported a regional 
approach to national implementing legislation or, for example the development of a regional CBM 
return which might also be expedient for countries in the region. Whatever method was chosen it 
was suggested that States Parties would need appropriate implementing legislation and tailored 
assistance. Such agreements should be simple and there should be little expectation of reporting. 
Indeed, it was suggested these states take their obligations seriously and they will not join if they 
incur additional costs for engagement or implementation. The speaker concluded with a toolkit for 
universalization, which included the following mechanisms:  
 Universalization contact group 
 Special envoy on universalization 
 Support and encouragement from trusted partners  
 Sponsorship for non-States Parties to attend BWC meetings 
 Implementation assistance 
 Legislative tools 




The speaker considered that there were a number of things that could be done relatively easily, such 
as regional initiatives, or the employment of a special envoy who would commit to working on this 
issue over a period of time.  
The discussion on universalization raised the issue of the WMD Free Zone in the Middle East and it 
was suggested that a legal perspective would need to be brought to bear, as this could mitigate the 
extent to which states could engage in meaningful posturing on these issues. Other participants 
queried what had happened to the work of the Sixth Review Conference on Universalization and 
pointed out that there was considerable variation in the actions undertaken by the Chairs of 
intersessional meetings. It was reiterated by one participant that the Seventh Review Conference 
could develop an initiative that brought in the troika supported by the ISU, which aimed at an 
interim target of 190 States Parties by the time of the Eighth Review Conference rather than 
reiterating the exhortations of the past. Other participants queried who would be most suited to get 
involved proposing that regional actors could be more weighty than external approaches.  
Final session 
The workshop concluded with expressions of thanks to Professor Jacques Diezi and Professor 
Jacques Dubochet of the University of Lausanne who had made the local arrangements on behalf of 
the hosts, the Association Suisse de Pugwash in association with the Geneva International Peace 
Research Institute GIPRI the Swiss Federal Authorities for supporting the meeting; and the Pugwash 
CBW Steering Committee and Pugwash International for their role in organising the meeting and to 
Claudia Vaughan for all the administrative arrangements.  
This concluded the workshop, which had fully occupied both days. There was lively discussion 
throughout and it was evident from the participants that the workshop had provided a valuable 
opportunity at which all the key issues on which decisions were anticipated at the Seventh Review 
Conference in 2011 could be discussed and ideas explored and analysed. The workshop was 
especially timely and valuable as it enabled several of the national experts and representatives 
participating in the Seventh Review Conference to engage in and further develop the key issues that 
had emerged from the workshops held around the world in the year and a half prior to the Review 
Conference.   
 
